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Article 8

BEARING THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S CROSSES:
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE v. SHELDON*
CHASE J. SANDERS**
In late 1992, Judge James Salmon of the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County struck down Maryland's "cross burning" law' as
violative of the First Amendment. The law required those who sought
to burn crosses publicly to notify the area fire department in advance
and to secure the permission of the owner of the property where the
burning was to occur.2 Ironically, Salmon's decision aroused a
topical controversy over a criminal statute that was, in prosecutors'
offices, anything but topical. Passed by the General Assembly in 1966,
the cross burning law lay dormant for a quarter century; Salmon's
opinion was the first by a Maryland court to cite the statute. The
statute's humble life as a prosecutorial tool probably was owed to its
widely, if tacitly, understood constitutional infirmity: it attempted to
suppress a specific message-albeit a hateful one-in contravention
of the First Amendment's basic command. As any lay person could
recognize, the State's alleged concern with preventing fires was merely
a pretext for the lawmakers' disagreement with the message inherent
in cross burning. How often do cross burnings start raging fires?
Thus, it is not surprising that the Maryland Court of Appeals
recently affirmed Judge Salmon's decision,3 or that it did so in two
essential steps. First, the court held that the act of burning a cross
constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes. 4 Then, the court
decided that the Maryland law could not survive the strict judicial
scrutiny that accompanies any governmental regulation that targets
speech because of its content.5 In short, the court reasoned that (A)
cross burning is speech and (B) governmental suppression of cross
burning therefore violates the First Amendment. If these determinations were somewhat obvious, however, what came between them was
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not. The bulk of the court's opinion in State v. Sheldon is devoted to
a complex explication of First Amendment doctrine that depicts the
judges having a palpably difficult time reconciling the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.6 In moving from point A
to point B, the Court of Appeals was forced to run a doctrinal
obstacle course.
This Article examines the Sheldon opinion, focusing on the
jurisprudential impediments that the Court of Appeals faced in
reaching its dispositive conclusions. In so doing, the Article uses the
court's opinion as a vehicle for exposing some of the flaws in the
Supreme Court's First Amendment framework. Part I sets forth the
opinion, highlighting the doctrinal difficulties that the Court of
Appeals encountered. Parts II and III explore two of the more
serious difficulties. Part II addresses the "content-based/contentneutral" distinction and the unfortunate effect that the doctrine of
"secondary effects" has on that distinction. Part III discusses the
Supreme Court's complex opinion in RA.V v. City of St. Paut and
argues that the R.A.V rule is a second-best alternative to eliminating
"fighting words" as a category of constitutionally unprotected speech.
The Article attempts to show that, by eliminating its "secondary
effects" and "fighting words" doctrines, the Supreme Court could
remove two imposing shoals that lower courts face when navigating
First Amendment jurisprudence.
I.

STATE V. SHELDON

A. The Facts and the Opening Premise
In October 1991, Brandon Sheldon set fire to a cross on the
property of a black family in Prince George's County.8 Five months
later, Thomas Cole did likewise on State-owned property in the'same
jurisdiction.9
Both men were indicted under Maryland's cross
burning statute. 0

6. Id. at 52-62, 629 A.2d at 757-62.
7. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
8. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 49, 629 A.2d at 755.
9. Id., 629 A.2d at 756.
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10A (1992) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to burn or cause to be burned any
cross or other religious symbol upon any private or public property within this
State without the express consent of the owner of such property and without first
giving notice to the fire department which services the area in which such
burning is to take place. Any person or persons who violates the provisions of
this section shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a felony and shall suffer
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Sheldon and Cole challenged their indictments in ajoint hearing
before Judge Salmon, alleging several constitutional deficiencies in
the cross burning statute." Judge Salmon agreed that the statute
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Accordingly, he overturned their indictments and the statute in a thoughtful-and doctrinally complex-opinion that presaged much of the
high court's review. 2 The State appealed.
Starting at point A, the Court of Appeals, unanimously per Chief
Judge Murphy, declared that the act of burning a cross or any other
religious symbol constitutes "speech" as that word is used in the First
Amendment. 3 Legally, this conclusion was a "no-brainer" for two
reasons. First, the court catalogued several Supreme Court decisions
defining as "speech" certain acts equally or more attenuated than
cross burning from the spoken or written word.' 4 These included
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,5 affording
free speech protection to students wearing black armbands to protest
the Vietnam War; Brown v. Louisiana,'6 protecting a sit-in at a lunch
counter; and Texas v. Johnson,'7 protecting the burning of the
American flag. Second, the Court of Appeals observed that the R.A. V
decision was, sub silentio, directly on point."8 In R.A.V, the Supreme
Court struck down on free speech grounds a municipal statute that
prohibited, among other acts, cross burning, thereby implicitly
recognizing cross burning as "speech."19
Sheldon's opening premise-that cross burning represents
constitutional speech-was both legally correct and eminently
reasonable. One who burns a cross in public clearly intends to send
a message. In light of the principles underlying the First Amendment, it cannot be relevant that he or she chooses to speak with
symbols rather than words. 20 As one commentator has observed, "if

punishment for a period not to exceed 3 years or shall be fined an amount not
to exceed $5,000 or shall suffer both such fine and imprisonment in the
discretion of the court.
Id
11. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 49, 629 A.2d at 756.
12. CT 92-0081A; CT 92-0817X (Nov. 24, 1992).
13. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 50-52, 629 A.2d at 756-57.
14. Id. at 51, 629 A.2d at 756-57.
15. 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
16. 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
17. 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989).
18. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 52, 629 A.2d at 756.
19. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
20. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 ("[W]e have long recognized that [First
Amendment] protection does not end at the spoken or written word.").
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thin slivers of processed wood pulp-papers-are obviously protected
when crafted to carry a message, why are thicker pieces of wood that
carry messages---crosses-any different?""
Before moving on to the doctrinal exegesis, one should note
what the Court of Appeals did not include in its opening premise.
The court never suggested that cross burning, though "speech" in the
eyes of the First Amendment, may fall into one of the narrow
categories of unprotected speech. As will become clear, this was an
important nondevelopment.
B.

The DoctrinalMaze

1. The Standard of Review.-The Court of Appeals then dove
headlong into the Supreme Court's extensivejurisprudence surrounding governmental regulation of speech.2" The first issue the judges
faced was determining the proper standard for evaluating the cross
burning law.23 The court began by setting forth the two most
commonly employed lenient standards for reviewing regulations of
speech.24 The court noted that, under the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. O'Brien,25 government may legitimately regulate
speech when: (a) the regulation is within the government's constitutional power; (b) the regulation furthers an important governmental
interest; (c) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of expression; and (d) the incidental restriction on expression is no
greater than necessary.26 By its very terms, the O'Brien standard
applies to speech regulations that are "unrelated to the suppression
of expression. "27
By contrast, under the Supreme Court's ruling in Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence,21 the Court of Appeals observed
that government may restrict speech if the restriction is "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave[s]

21. Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARV. L. REv. 124, 134 (1992).
22. The reader should bear in mind that Part I focuses on the Sheldon opinion and,
thus, explains the pertinent First Amendment doctrine only to the extent the Court of
Appeals did. The doctrine will be more fully discussed infra in Parts II and III.
23. This question also was the most important, insofar as a speech regulation's
constitutional fate often hinges on whether it receives relaxed or heightened scrutiny. See
infra text accompanying notes 90-93.
24. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 53-54, 629 A.2d at 758.
25. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
26. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 53, 629 A.2d at 758 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
27. Id at 53, 629 A.2d at 758.
28. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. " ' The Clark standard, the court noted, applies to regulations
that restrict only the "time, place, or manner""° of expression or that
are "content-neutral."3 1 The court explained that a "content-neutral"
restriction, according to Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,32 is one that
is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."3
The doctrinal soup, one observes, already has gotten thick.
Indeed, at this point in the Sheldon opinion, the Court of Appeals
stopped, took a breath, and recapitulated the doctrine it had just
delineated in condensed form.3 4 The court noted, however, that the
complexity of the jurisprudence was more apparent than real; while
the O'Brien and Clark standards are "formally distinct" in terms of the
exact species of speech regulations to which they apply, the court
quoted the Supreme Court's own observation that the O'Brien test is
"little, if any, different"35 from Clark's "time, place, or manner"
standard. 6
The court then spelled out the other, more demanding standard
for reviewing speech regulations. This standard applies, the court
observed, to regulations that are neither unrelated to the suppression
of expression nor content-neutral-in other words, to "content-based"
regulations. 37 Under Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n 3 1 "[s]tates must show that [such] regulations [are] necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and that [they are] narrowly drawn

29. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 54, 629 A.2d at 758 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
33. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 53-54, 629 A.2d at 758 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48
(citations omitted)).
34. Id. at 54, 629 A.2d at 758.
35. Id. (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 298).
36. What the Court of Appeals did not note at this point, but could have, is that there
also is little difference between the species of regulations to which the standards apply.
A regulation that is "unrelated to the suppression of expression," such as the prohibition
on burning one's draft card at issue in O'Brien, is little different vis-a-vis the First
Amendment's purposes than one that seeks to regulate the "time, place or manner" of
expression, such as the prohibition on sleeping in a public park at issue in Clark. Both
types of regulations are subsets of the general category of "content-neutral" restrictions
and, thus, are reviewed under similar standards. See infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
37. Sheldon, 332 Md. 54-55, 629 A.2d at 758-59.
38. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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to achieve that end."39 This standard, of course, represents strict
scrutiny.'
The Court of Appeals then held that the cross burning statute
was content-based, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, for two
reasons.4 1 First, referring to its earlier definition of content-neutrality, the court opined that the statute was not "justied without
reference to the content of the regulated speech." 42 The court
posited that the law could not be justified as a fire protection
measure-and thus could not be justified without looking to the
speech it regulated-because it added little in scope to Maryland's
pre-existing fire protection scheme.4 3 Statutory and common law
already broadly criminalize trespass and arson, argued the court, so
how could the legislature justify the separate criminalization of one
small threat of fire? In so reasoning, however, the court met its first
major doctrinal difficulty. There is no requirement that all statutes
sweep broadly, or that statutes cannot visit incremental change upon
the fields they regulate. There is no denying that, as written, the
cross burning law was a fire protection measure, even if a trivial one.
Doctrinally, at least, the court had to stretch to deem the statute
"content-based." 44
The court's second reason for declaring the statute content-based
explains why it stretched the doctrine. This was that, more important
than any doctrine, the legislature intended to suppress the communicative element of cross burning.45 The court sketched the legislative
history of two amendments to the cross burning statute, enacted in
1980 and 1981, by which the General Assembly stiffened the penalties

39. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 55, 629 A.2d at 759 (quoting Peny, 460 U.S. at 45).
40. Id. at 55, 629 A.2d at 758-59. The salient observation at this juncture is the Court
of Appeals's definition of "content-based" regulations, a notion to be discussed in detail
in Part II. By defining a "content-based" regulation as one that relates to speech and is
not content-neutral-that is, by defining "content-based" as merely the opposite of contentneutral-the court left its earlier definition of content-neutrality as the only doctrinal
foundation on which to decide the all-important question of whether the cross burning
statute was in fact content-neutral (and thus worthy of lenient scrutiny) or content-based
(requiring strict scrutiny). See infra text accompanying notes 90-93 for further discussion
of standards of review for statutes regulating speech.
41. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 55, 629 A.2d at 759.
42. Id. at 56, 629 A.2d at 759 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48).
43. Id.
44. To add to the confusion, the State conceded that the statute was content-based even
as it argued that the statute was "justifiedwithout reference to the content of the regulated
speech." The court rejected the concession, id. at 55 n.1, 629 A.2d at 759 n.1, and then
held the statute content-based anyway.
45. Id. at 56-57, 629 A.2d at 759-60.
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for noncompliant cross burners.46 This history indicated that the
legislature never intended the cross burning statute as a fire protection measure at all, but as a means of burdening the act of burning
religious symbols.4 7 The court noted that the law was sponsored by
a civil rights activist in an era of racial tension and was amended
amidst lofty rhetoric that decried intimidation and fear as opposed to
the threat of fires.4 " From this, the court deduced that the General
Assembly's motive in passing the cross burning statute was to quell the
message, and not the specter of conflagration, in the act of cross
burning. Thus, the court fortified its unsteady doctrinal conclusion
that the statute was content-based by pointing to the government's
apparent censorial purpose in enacting the statute. Improper motive
trumped uncertain doctrine to render the statute content-based, and
the court was ready to apply strict scrutiny.
2. The R.A.V. Hierarchy.-Before it could apply strict scrutiny,
however, the court chose to run a second doctrinal gauntlet. In
KA. V, the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance that
criminalized, inter alia, cross burning.49 The Minnesota Supreme
Court had attempted to save the ordinance by narrowly construing it
to prohibit only "fighting words," or words that "tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace"50 and that, therefore, do not receive
First Amendment protection." The United States Supreme Court,
though it accepted Minnesota's narrow construction, nevertheless
overturned the statute by fashioning a rule against content-based
regulations even within unprotected classes of speech such as fighting
words.5 2 Because St. Paul's ordinance outlawed only "politically

46. Id. There was no legislative history of the law's original enactment in 1966. Id. at
56, 629 A.2d at 759.
47. Id. at 56-57, 629 A.2d at 759.
48. Id.
49. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992). The Minnesota statute
provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
50. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
51. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542; see Sheldon, 332 Md. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760.
52. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543-45. Apparently focusing on the RA.V. holding, the Court
of Appeals did not explicitly state the R.A. V rule. See Sheldon, 332 Md. at 58-60, 629 A.2d
at 760-61.
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selected" fighting words, it was impermissibly content-based. 3
However, the Supreme Court delineated three exceptions to its
rule (none of which saved the St. Paul ordinance). 54 These exceptions provided the Court of Appeals with its second major doctrinal
impediment. In Sheldon, the Court of Appeals felt compelled to
explain the R.A.V exceptions and to evaluate Maryland's cross
burning statute against them, even though the State never argued that its
cross burningstatute proscribed only fighting words, which meant that the
RA.V rule and its exceptions technically were not in play.55 In
other words, because the Court of Appeals (unlike the Minnesota
Supreme Court) never construed the Maryland cross burning statute
as regulating only unprotected speech, R.A. V's rule against contentbased regulations of unprotected speech and its exceptions were
theoretically inapposite. 6 Why the court chose to address the R.A. V
exceptions thus is unclear.5
In any event, the court plunged in. The first R.A.V exception
"occurs 'when the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely
of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable."' 58 The Court of Appeals offered the Supreme Court's own
example of such a situation: a content-based prohibition of only the
most lascivious forms of obscenity would be constitutionally permissible, for lasciviousness is the very reason obscenity is proscribable.5 9
The second R.A. V exception occurs when a content-based statute
aims only at "the 'secondary effects' of the targeted speech and so is
yustified without reference to the content of the regulated speech."'"
This exception derives from Renton, the court explained, in which the
Supreme Court upheld a city zoning ordinance restricting adult movie
theaters to certain isolated areas.6" The Supreme Court accepted
the city's argument that the ordinance targeted not the expressive
elements of adult theaters but the "secondary effects" of those
theaters-increased crime and decreased commerce and property
53. Id. For the Court of Appeals's treatment of R.A.V., see Sheldon, 332 Md. at 58, 629
A.2d at 760.
54. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. 2545-47.
55. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 58-60, 629 A.2d at 760-61.
56. Herein lies the importance of the Court's threshold omission to interpret cross
burning as possibly unprotected speech.
57. For speculation as to why the Court of Appeals addressed the R.A. V. exceptions,
see infra text accompanying notes 152-154.
58. 332 Md. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760 (quoting R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2545).
59. Id. (citing RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545).
60. Id. at 58-59, 629 A.2d 760 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41,
48 (1986)).
61. Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.
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values-and thus treated the ordinance, though facially content-based,
as content-neutral. 62 Hence, the second exception to the RA. V rule
consists of Renton-like situations in which an "apparently content-based
63
statute has content-neutral intentions."
The third exception to the R.A. V rule occurs when "there is no
64
realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."
Again, the Court of Appeals provided the Supreme Court's own
example: "a state could prohibit only those obscene movies featuring
blue-eyed actresses . . . because the targeting of that subset [of

obscenity] would be utterly unrelated to suppressing ideas."65 The
Court of Appeals perceptively noted that the third R.A.V exception
simply is a generalized version of the first; a state may proscribe any
subset of constitutionally proscribable speech, not only for the very
reason the speech is proscribable in the first place, but also for any
reason unrelated to suppressing speech.'
The Court of Appeals then set about evaluating the cross burning
statute under the three RA.V exceptions, even though it was, as
suggested above, a foregone conclusion that the exceptions would not
save the statute because the LA. V rule was literally inapplicable in
Sheldon.6 7 The first exception did not apply, the court noted
summarily, for insofar as the State had not argued that the cross
burning law regulated fighting words at all, the statute could hardly
be cast as an effort to regulate only the most inciteful of constitutionally proscribable fighting words.6
Nor did the cross burning law, said the court, have Renton-like
"content-neutral intentions," for several reasons. The first two,
unsurprisingly, were the same as those on which the court relied when
deciding that the statute was not content-neutral in the first place:
the law's "scant contribution to Maryland's fire protection scheme," 69

62. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 59, 629 A.2d at 761 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49).
doctrine of "secondary effects" will be discussed in detail infra in Part II.B.
63. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760.
64. Id. at 59, 629 A.2d at 761 (quoting RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2547).
65. Id. at 59-60, 629 A.2d at 761 (citing RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547).
66. Id. at 59, 629 A.2d at 761.

The

67. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
68. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761-62. The State did not even contend that
the first RA.V. exception applied to the cross burning law. The State's entire argument
in defense of the statute consisted of (a) the second RA.V. exception (the Renton
doctrine); (b) the third RA.V. exception; and (c) the argument that the statute was
necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest (that it
survived strict scrutiny). Id. at 60-62, 629 A.2d 761-62.
69. Id. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762.
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and its legislative history indicating an intent to suppress speech.70
The Court of Appeals then added a third reason specific to the
context of the second R.A.V exception: the alleged "secondary
effects" of cross burning were dubious at best.7' Unlike the threat
of crime or reduced property values surrounding adult theaters, the
court opined, the threat of fires from burning crosses is rather
tenuous. 72 The State's failure to regulate other activities that pose
a far more significant threat of fires, such as "the burning of leaves or
cars, or having barbecues or bonfires,"7 3 undermined its claim that
it was attacking only the "secondary effects" of cross burning. 74 As
the court succinctly observed, "[T]he State has chosen to regulate
such a small subset of potential blazes that its allegedly contentneutral goal of protecting the citizenry from inferno cannot be taken
75
seriously."
Finally, the third R.A.V exception did not apply, the court
determined, because the State had failed to argue that the cross
burning statute regulated only proscribable speech. This failure
undercut any claim that the law carved out a subset of proscribable
speech for reasons unrelated to suppressing that speech.76 In any
event, the court noted, for the reasons discussed in dispelling the
second exception, the cross burning statute clearly was related to
suppressing speech.77
Having determined that the cross burning statute was contentbased and was not saved by any of the R.A. V exceptions, the Court of
Appeals had cleared its doctrinal hurdles in assessing the statute's
constitutionality. The court had, at last, reached point B: it was ready
to apply strict scrutiny to the State's regulation of speech.
C. The Inevitable Conclusion
Under strict scrutiny, the cross burning law stood no chance.
The court reiterated the test: "To survive strict scrutiny, a law must
be 'necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . .narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.'"" In a last-gasp effort to save its statute,

70. ad at 60, 629 A.2d at 761.
71. Id. at 60-61, 629 A.2d at 761-62.
72. Id. at 61, 629 A.2d at 762.
73. Id.
74. Id
75. Id.
76. Id at 61-62, 629 A.2d at 762.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
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the State reversed course and discarded all pretensions of the statute
as a fire prevention measure. The statute, claimed the State,
furthered a compelling governmental interest in eradicating racial
and religious disharmony and in promoting social tolerance.79
Though it accepted this governmental interest, the Court of Appeals
nonetheless concluded that the cross burning law was not "necessary"
to serve it.80 The statute, said the court, only inconveniences a few
bigots; it does nothing to remedy the effects of their bigotry, which is
the true measure of an effective antidiscrimination statute." Thus,
the cross burning law must fall. 2
The court's conclusion, like its opening premise, was eminently
reasonable. After all, laws rarely survive strict scrutiny, even if they are
well-intentioned; the Bill of Rights cannot be cast aside "even for the
noblest of purposes." 3 But even though it reached the right result,
the Sheldon opinion is, in one way, troubling. In its graphic depiction
of the doctrinal jungle that First Amendment law has become, Sheldon
does little to reassure one's faith in the courts' continuing ability to
keep the First Amendment's basic principles in mind. The next two
parts explore the two knotty areas of the jungle that entangled the
Court of Appeals and suggest how some of the vines may be cut away.
II.

THE CROSS BURNING STATUTE:

CONTENT-NEUTRAL OR
CONTENT-BASED?

A.

The Basic Framework

The Supreme Court's basic First Amendment jurisprudence
classifies governmental regulations of speech into two categories.84
Regulations that limit communication without regard to the message
conveyed are deemed "content-neutral.""
Laws restricting billboards, outdoor concerts, or public preaching after dark are all
content-neutral regulations.8 6 By contrast, regulations that limit

79. Id.
80. Id. at 63, 629 A.2d at 762-63.
81. Id. at 63-64, 629 A.2d at 763.

82. I at 64, 629 A.2d at 763.
83. Id at 63, 629 A.2d at 763.
84. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1988)

(discussing a "two-track" approach in First Amendment analysis).
85. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY

L. REV. 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation].
86. For actual examples of content-neutral regulations in First Amendment
jurisprudence, see, e.g., Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) (involving a law against posting signs on public property); Schneider v. Town of
Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (addressing a law against distribution of leaflets); Eanes v.
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communication because of the message conveyed are "contentbased."8 7 Laws restricting political advertisements or racist newsletters would be content-based. 8 The First Amendment, of course,
keeps vigilance over both types of regulations, for both contentneutral and content-based restrictions of speech can threaten the
values underlying that Amendment, principally the search for truth
through free exchange in the "marketplace of ideas."8 9
As the Sheldon court indicated, however, content-neutral statutes
generally receive more lenient constitutional scrutiny than contentbased statutes.9" Content-neutral statutes usually are subjected to
some form of judicial balancing test, most commonly the Clark or
O'Brien tests.9 These balancing tests permit courts to look favorably
on statutes that legitimately further governmental interests without
incidentally suppressing too much speech and, conversely, to look
disparagingly on statutes that do the opposite." Content-based
regulations, by contrast, generally receive strict scrutiny, for they are
presumptively invalid.93

State, 318 Md. 436, 569 A.2d 604 (1990) (discussing a noise ordinance).
87. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 190 (emphasis added).
88. For jurisprudential examples, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(involving a law restricting the distribution of obscene material); Burson v. Freeman, 112
S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (discussing a law prohibiting political solicitation within 100 feet of a
polling place on election day). While the foregoing definitions of "content-neutral" and
"content-based" provide the basic framework in First Amendment law, commentators have
pointed out that the distinction is a simplistic one that often blurs. See, e.g., Martin H.
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
89. A thorough discussion of the First Amendment's philosophical underpinnings is
obviously beyond the scope of this Article. For such a discussion, see Stone, Content
Regulation, supra note 85, at 193 n.8, and citations therein.
90. See supra Part I.A.1.
91. See id.; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 193; Redish, supra note 88, at
119; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987)
[hereinafter Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions] (discussing seven different balancing tests
that the Supreme Court has used to evaluate content-neutral speech regulations).
92. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 193.
93. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992). One commonly cited
subspecies of content-based regulations is the viewpoint-based restriction, which is a law that
suppresses the communication of a particular point of view. Statutes restricting criticism
of the government or antiunion demonstrations would constitute viewpoint-based
regulations. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (involving a law prohibiting the
display of signs bringing foreign governments into disrepute within 500 feet of their
embassies). Viewpoint-based regulations represent a particularly pernicious form of
content-based statutes, for "by effectively excising a specific message from public debate,
[they] mutilate[] 'the thinking process of the community' and [are] thus incompatible
with the central precepts of the first amendment." Stone, Content Regulation, supra note
85, at 198. For this reason, the Supreme Court usually will not allow the lack of viewpoint
discrimination to excuse a content-based statute. Boos, 485 U.S. at 319.
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Commentators have advanced four basic rationales for the
distinction in treatment between content-based and content-neutral
statutes. First, because content-neutral regulations treat all speakers
equally while content-based restrictions discriminate against certain
speakers, a concern for equality would dictate more exacting scrutiny
of content-based regulations.94 Second, content-neutral regulations
affect all speech equally, but content-based restrictions impede only
certain substantive areas of speech and thereby distort the public
debate; hence, content-based regulations require more careful
review. 95
Third, unlike content-neutral restrictions, content-based regulations raise the specter of government trying to shield the citizenry
from what it deems an undesirable "communicative impact" of certain
speech.9 6 This rationale suggests that courts must carefully scrutinize
content-based regulations to ensure that government is not
paternalistically concerned with preventing people from hearing "bad"
or provocative speech, instead of allowing the populace to conduct its
own fully informed search for truth.9 7 Finally, closely related to the
third rationale is the notion that content-based regulations, unlike
content-neutral ones, evoke the suspicion that government is
censoring speech with which it disagrees.9" This rationale justifies
demanding scrutiny of content-based regulations even more than the
third rationale, for governmental suppression of speech simply
because the government disagrees with that speech offends the First
Amendment's "search for truth" ideal even more than suppression of
speech for paternalistic reasons. Both the third and fourth rationales,
however, share a common thread: content-based regulations evince
the possibility that government has an improper motive in suppressing
speech, a motive that stems from misguided paternalism or selfindulgence rather than from a legitimate effort to serve the people.99

94. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CHI.
L. REv. 20 (1975); Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 201.
95. See Andrea Oser, Note, Motivation Analysis in Light ofRenton, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
344, 353 (1987); Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 217.
96. See Oser, supra note 95, at 354; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 207.
97. See Oser, supra note 95, at 354; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 207;
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-19 (1982).

98. See Oser, supra note 95, at 354; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 227.
99. Because it is probably rare that the government acts purely out of its own opinion
in suppressing speech, but usually also desires to forestall the influence of that speech on
the public, the third and fourth rationales often coexist. See Oser, supra note 95, at 354
n.67 (citing John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancingin FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975)). Thus, concern with
improper motive is probably a more accurate, as well as more convenient, means of
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So which was Maryland's cross burning statute, content-neutral or
content-based? The answer was difficult enough under the Supreme
Court's basic "two-track" framework. Arguably, the statute was
content-neutral: by imposing only logistical restrictions on the act of
cross burning, the statute on its face regulated that act without regard
to its communicative elements."°° Furthermore, the law did not ban
cross burning outright; it levied only "place" (where the property
owner has consented) and "manner" (after notifying the local fire
department) restrictions on the act of burning crosses. 0 1
In fact, the cross burning law was both content-neutral and
content-based, because it imposed place and manner restrictions but
also targeted a certain type of speech: cross burning. Therefore, it
was a "hybrid": a content-based "time, place or manner" regulation. 2 Thus, the cross burning statute beautifully confounded the
Supreme Court's basic First Amendment framework, even before the
knots in the doctrine. The Court of Appeals faced a doctrinal
conundrum in the cross burning statute simply through the nature of
3
0

the statute itself.1

How, then, did the court conclude that the statute was contentbased? To answer this question, one must examine the twist in the
doctrine.
B.

The Monkey Wrench: the Doctrine of Secondary Effects

As the Court of Appeals explained in Sheldon, the Supreme Court
in Renton upheld a municipal ordinance that zoned adult movie
theaters into certain discrete locations.10 4 The Court did so by

describing the third and fourth rationales for the content-based/content-neutral
distinction.
100. See supra note 10 (quoting the cross burning statute).
101. See id.
102. See Oser, supra note 95, at 345; Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis
After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (1989).
103. At this point, one may wonder why the State conceded that the statute was contentbased, see supra note 44, when in fact it had plausible arguments to assert that the statute
was content-neutral. One can only conclude that the State blundered. Presumably, the
State was confused by the content-based element of the cross burning statute, namely, the
fact that the statute applied to only one small realm of speech. The State should have
argued that, as a place and manner regulation that did not ban cross burning, the statute
was content-neutral. The State's confusion in conceding that the statute was content-based
is ironic: it shows that the State, too, was focused on the cross burning statute as a speech
regulation, not as a fire protection measure. For an outline of the State's three-part argument, see supra note 68; for further discussion as to how the State argued, see infra notes
152-154 and accompanying text.
104. She/don, 332 Md. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760-61 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
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accepting Renton's argument that its ordinance aimed not at the
content of the "expression" in adult theaters, but at the "secondary
effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." °5 These
"secondary effects" included increased crime and deleterious effects
on "the city's retail trade, .

.

. property values, and . .. quality of

urban life."10'6 Though the Court admitted that the Renton ordinance "treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from
other kinds of theaters,"10 7 it held that the ordinance's focus on
"secondary effects" rendered it "completely consistent with our
definition of content-neutral speech regulations as those that 'are
justied without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.""0 " The statute should be treated as content-neutral, the
Court continued, because its focus on secondary effects obviated the
usual concern underlying content-based statutes: that "'government
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views.'" 1" Thus, applying the Clark standard for
content-neutral "time, place or manner" restrictions, 0 the Renton
Court upheld the ordinance."'
Renton's reasoning is dubious. The Supreme Court treated the
Renton ordinance as content-neutral because it was supposedly
"justfied without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.""' But was it? In one sense, one must refer to the content
of the speech that the Renton ordinance regulated in order to justify
it, for the ordinance's concern with particular "secondary effects"
arose only on account of the regulated speech. As one commentator
has noted, "a regulation is content-based if the danger sought to be
avoided is created by the content of the speech regulated."" 3 In
Renton, the Supreme Court attempted to divorce the city's asserted
justification for the statute from the particular speech it regulated.
But this was impossible: the justification hinged directly on the

105. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
106. I& at 48.
107. Id. at 47.
108. Id. at 48 (quoting, with emphasis, Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
109. Id. at 48-49 (quoting Police Dept.v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
111. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55.
112. Id. at 48.
113. Oser, supra note 95, at 347.
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speech. If the theater were not an adult cinema, the alleged
"secondary effects" would not have been a threat.11 4
Ironically, Maryland's cross burning statute may have come closer
to being 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech" than the ordinance at issue in Renton. The harm that the
cross burning law ostensibly sought to address was well-recognized and
was not unique to the restricted speech. As the Sheldon court
observed, any number of activities present fire hazards. 15 By
contrast, few if any business establishments other than adult theaters
raise the specter of degenerative "secondary effects." In this light,
Maryland seemed more justified than Renton in raising the "secondary effects" flag, for Maryland was less vulnerable to the charge that
it was disguising its dislike for the regulated speech by pointing to a
"secondary effect" unique to that speech.
This was so, however, only by pure coincidence arising from the
fact that the speech in Sheldon was symbolic. The act of cross burning
allows one to "speak" through the confined use of fire. While
government is not ordinarily in the habit of restrictively zoning
business enterprises to prevent crime, government is in the habit of
regulating fire hazards to prevent destructive blazes. In Sheldon,
Maryland tried to seize on the fact that cross burning involves an
ordinarily regulable activity to suppress the communicative aspect of
cross burning. The Court of Appeals, however, saw through the
16
1

State's attempt.

The State's disingenuous effort illustrates the problem with the
doctrine of "secondary effects": it allows government to make an end
run around the content-based/content-neutral distinction and the
rationales underlying that distinction. The "secondary effects"

114. See Kimberly K. Smith, Zoning Adult Entertainment: A Reassessment of Renton, 79
CALIF. L. REV. 119, 142 (1991) ("The secondary effects addressed by adult-use zoning
ordinances flow from the sexual content of the speech; the adult businesses would not
have deleterious effects if they sold only chemistry textbooks.")
115. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 56, 629 A.2d at 759.
116. As Part I indicates, the court rejected the State's "secondary effects" argument in
two parts. Initially, it determined the statute to be content-based, finding that Renton's
doctrinal definition of content neutrality did not apply to the cross burning law. See supra
text accompanying notes 41-48. Later, in addressing the RA.V. rule and its exceptions,
the court held Renton's reasoning inapposite to the cross burning law and thereby directly
rejected the notion that the State's concern with "secondary effects" should afford the
statute content-neutral analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75. The reader
should not be confused by the fact that the court did not fully grapple with the doctrine
of "secondary effects" until it discussed the R.A. V. exceptions, which are discussed infra in
Part III.B., for the "secondary effects" doctrine long preceded R.A. V. The State in Sheldon
just happened to invoke "secondary effects" through the vehicle of the R.A.V. exceptions.
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doctrine permits government to conceal its effort to target speech
based on its content by pointing to some neutral reason why the
speech is harmful." 7 Thus, the doctrine facilitates governmental
ability to harbor an improper motive in regulating speech, which
undermines the third and fourth
rationales for the content18
based/content-neutral distinction.'
The Supreme Court should abandon the doctrine of "secondary
effects" because the government should not be allowed to enact
content-based speech restrictions simply because it professes to have
a good reason. Indeed, the government will always profess to have a
good reason." 9 Instead, as the Court opined well before it created
the "secondary effects" doctrine, the government must have a
compelling reason for regulating speech, and its regulation must be
necessary and narrowly drawn to achieve the government's purpose. 120 In short, content-based regulations must remain subject to
strict scrutiny.
In lieu of the "secondary effects" doctrine, courts would do well
to follow an alternative rule in cases like Sheldon, which involve speech
restrictions that confound the standard content-based/content-neutral
distinction. In such cases, courts should look directly to the government's motive to determine what standard of review to apply to the
regulation.' 21 The Court of Appeals did so in Sheldon, and thus it
properly determined that the cross burning statute was contentbased. 122 Along the way, unfortunately, the doctrine of "secondary

117. See TRIBE, supra note 84, § 12-3, at 798 n.17 ("The [Renton] Court ...found that,
despite the restriction's outward appearance, it was not content-based, because the
government chose to defend the rule with reasons other than its impact on the minds of

listeners." (emphasis in original)).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
119. See Ely, supra note 99, at 1496 ("Restrictions on free expression are rarely defended
on the ground that the state simply didn't like what the defendant was saying; reference
will generally be made to some danger beyond the message.. .

.");

Stone, Content-Neutral

Restrictions, supra note 91, at 56 ("[G]overnment rarely admits that it is attempting to
restrict a particular message because it disagrees with the ideas expressed. Rather, the
government usually claims that legitimate governmental interests support the restriction.");
Oser, supra note 95, at 351 ("Read broadly, Renton implies that most restrictions on speech
will be reviewed with a balancing test [i.e., are content-neutral].")
120. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
121. See Oser, supra note 95, at 351-61 (urging courts to analyze the government's
motive).
122. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 57, 629 A.2d at 760. In fact, the statute was not only contentbased but viewpoint-based, see supra note 93, insofar as it primarily suppressed the
ideological position reflected in the act of cross burning. That the doctrine of "secondary
effects" could conceivably afford content-neutral analysis to a viewpoint-based statute
further demonstrates the inconsistency in that doctrine.
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effects" presented a distracting doctrinal cover for the State's true
motive and a doctrinal cross for the court to bear in protecting
speech.
III.

CROSS

A.

BURNING, FIGHTING WORDS, AND

RA. V

The Basic Framework (Continued)

There is one further twist to the Supreme Court's basic First
Amendment jurisprudence outlined in Part II.A. The Court has long
recognized that
[t] here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech ... [that] are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.123
These categories of speech, which consist primarily of private libel,
obscenity, and "fighting words," do not enjoy First Amendment
protection; government may constitutionally proscribe them.124
Of importance in Sheldon is the fighting words category. In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court sustained the
conviction of a Jehovah's Witness under a statute prohibiting,
essentially, name calling in public.12 5 Walter Chaplinsky, after
stirring up a crowd by preaching against organized religion, denounced the Rochester city marshal-to his face-as "a God damned
racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." 126 These epithets, almost quaint
by contemporary standards, struck the Supreme Court as "'fighting'
words-those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." 27 Thus the Court begat
"fighting words" as a categorical exception to the First Amendment's
28
protection of speech.

123. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
124. See id,; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 194-95. There are several other
discrete areas of unprotected speech, such as child pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747 (1982), and certain commercial speech, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note
85, at 194-95.
125. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568.
126. Id. at 569-70.
127. It at 572.
128. Subsequent decisions have narrowed the scope of the fighting words doctrine. In
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court reversed the conviction of a young man
who wore a jacket reading "Fuck the Draft" into a Los Angeles courtroom. The Court
held, inter alia, that these offensive words did not rise to the level of unprotected fighting

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:494

Does the act of cross burning constitute fighting words? The idea
seems tenuous. Crosses are not usually burned in the middle of an
escalating war of words, in which one party overreacts and throws a
verbal "punch." The very effort required to assemble or obtain a
cross fit for burning, then to set it afire, makes cross burning an
unwieldy weapon in a verbal fight. Rather, cross burning usually
provides misguided zealots with a means for disturbing the nighttime
tranquility and, thereby, comprises the first words in a verbal battle
that may or may not follow once the targeted audience has become
aware of the message. Cross burning is not the final jeer that
provokes an excited crowd into a melee; cross burning is the
laborious effort to create an atmosphere of hostility in the first place.
So the notion that cross burning could threaten immediate violence
or "incite an immediate breach of the peace," 1 9 when it usually
takes time for unaware listeners to even "hear" the speech, seems
somewhat peculiar. 130 Or so one might have thought, until RA.V
131
v. City of St. Paul.
B. The Monkey Wrench: R.A.V.
In R.A. V., the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of
several teenagers, including Robert A. Viktora, under the St. Paul
statute quoted in Part I-A. 132 Viktora and his friends had burned a
cross inside the fenced yard of a black family early one morning in
June 1990.133 The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to rescue

words because they created no immediate threat of violence. Id. at 23. See also
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the government cannot
prohibit advocacy of violence or lawlessness unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.");
Note, "Adding the First Amendment to the Fire". Cross Burning and Hate Crime Laws, 26
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1126-30 (1993).
129. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
130. One may still argue that cross burning constitutes words that "inflict injury." The
Supreme Court has never upheld a speaker's conviction under this part of the Chaplinsky
test, however-not even in Chaplinsky,where the state statute at issue precluded only words
tending to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
Moreover, the continuing viability of the "inflict injury" dictum in Chaplinsky is in doubt;
the Court has subsequently referred to the fighting words doctrine as words "'which by
their very utterance ... tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.'" Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,525 (1972) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572); seeNote, TheDemise
of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its Intermen4 106 HARV. L. REV.
1129 (1993) [hereinafter Demise of Chaplinsky].
131. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
132. Id. at 2550; see supra note 49 (quoting the St. Paul statute).
133. RA.V., 112 S.Ct. at 2541.
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St. Paul's ordinance by reading it to prohibit only fighting words.13 4
That court thereby conceived the notion of cross burning as fighting
words, which the Supreme Court was bound to accept.1 5 The
Supreme Court nonetheless struck down the statute because the
statute was impermissibly content-based in prohibiting only fighting
words on "specified disfavored topics."136 In so doing, the majority,
per Justice Scalia, constructed an "ornate conceptual castle"' 7 that
imposed an intricate new rule on First Amendment jurisprudence.
The rule is this: government may not enact content-based speech
restrictions even within the proscribable classes of speech. (The majority
asserted that this rule was not new; 3 s but three concurring Justices
thought otherwise.13 9 ) The majority reasoned that the unprotected
classes of speech
can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated
because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity,
defamation, etc.)-[but are not] categories of speech
entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be
made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to
their distinctively proscribable content."
In other words, the majority suggested, the proscribable classes of
speech are unique in the sense that they can be regulated on account
of their content; but they are not unique in the sense that they
cannot be regulated for other invidious reasons.
It was this sentiment that the majority attempted to capture in
delineating its three exceptions to the new rule. 4 ' The first and
third exceptions were new. The first exception, as the Maryland
Court of Appeals recounted in Sheldon, is that government may enact

134. Id.
135. Id. at 2542.
136. Id. at 2547; see supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
137. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Hate Speech Case: A Pyrrhic Victory for Freedom of Speech?,
21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 285, 285 (1992).
138. RA.V, 112 S.CL at 2543 ("Our cases surely do not establish the proposition that
the First Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances
of ... proscribable expression, so that the government 'may regulate [them] freely.'")
(quoting RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White. J, concurring)).
139. Id. at 2552 (White, J,concurring) ("Th[e] categorical approach has provided a
principled and narrowly focused means for distinguishing between expression that the
government may regulate freely and that which it may regulate on the basis of content
only upon a showing of compelling need. Today, however, the Court announces that
earlier Courts did not mean their repeated statements that certain categories of expression
are 'not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.'") (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 2543 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 2545-47. None of the exceptions applied to the St. Paul ordinance.
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content-based regulations within the proscribable categories of speech
when the basis for the regulation consists entirely of the reason that
the speech is proscribable in the first place."' The third exception
is, as the Court of Appeals observed, simply a more general reiteration
of the first: 143 government may enact content-based regulations
within the proscribable speech categories for any reason not evincing
the "realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."' 44
These exceptions were necessarily born with the R.A.V rule. If
the government may not generally impose content-based restrictions
on the unprotected classes of speech, it may do so where its actions
indicate no censorial purpose. To hold otherwise would, perversely,
hold government to a higher standard in regulating unprotected
speech, because government is generally free to regulate protected
speech so long as it has no censorial purpose. 45 The difference is
that, in the context of protected speech, content-based statutes usually
indicate a censorial purpose (hence they receive strict scrutiny);
whereas in the context of unprotected speech, content-based statutes
do not presumptively indicate a censorial purpose, because government may legitimately proscribe the speech on account of its content.
Hence, government should remain free to enact content-based
restrictions of unprotected speech so long as it does not attempt to
suppress ideas, just as it may enact content-neutral regulations of
protected speech under the same condition.'"
But the R/A.V majority had to create another exception to its
new rule: the Renton "secondary effects" doctrine. 4 7 In Renton, as
is by now thoroughly familiar, the Court applied a content-neutral
analysis to a content-based statute regulating obscenity, a category of
proscribable speech.1'
The Court thereby approved a contentbased regulation of an unprotected class of speech, which would not
have fallen within the new R.A.V exceptions. Thus, to avoid
overruling Renton, the RA. V majority had to create a special Renton

142. Id. at 2545; see supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
143. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
144. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547; see supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. It is suggested infra that, because government ordinarily may enact content-neutral
restrictions of protected speech but will have to justify content-based ones, R.A.V. creates
a working rule that government may enact content-based restrictions of unprotected
speech but will have to justify viewpoint-based ones. See supra note 93.
147. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546; see supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
148. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-50; see supra text accompanying
notes 105-111.
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exception to the RA.V rule.'4 9 That Renton may have forced the
Court's hand in creating another KA.V exception indicates that,
appropriately, the Court may have gotten caught in its own doctrinal
50
web.1
In any event, one wonders, how did all this elaborate RA.V
doctrine apply to Sheldon? Technically, it didn't. As mentioned in
Part I, Maryland never argued that the act of cross burning constitutes
proscribable fighting words; thus, it never provided the Court of
Appeals with any threshold basis for invoking R.A.V 15 1 The State
apparently was in such a hurry to distinguish R.A. V-by pigeonholing
Sheldon into one of the RA.V exceptions-that it did not recognize
that the whole R.A. V hierarchy was inapposite. 52 The court
discussed RA.V and its exceptions anyway, probably in deference to

149. Conceivably, the majority could have incorporated Renton into the third R.A.V.
exception by arguing that a statute's concern with "secondary effects" raises "no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547. But
perhaps sensitive to the frequent criticism of Renton--as articulated in Part II and by
others-that the "secondary effects" doctrine can disguise just such a "realistic possibility,"
the majority may have felt safer creating a separate "secondary effects" exception to its new
rule.
150. FourJustices concurred in the RA. V. result. Justice White, writing for himself and
two otherJustices, argued that the Court's precedents had established that government can
enact any type of speech restriction within the unprotected classes of speech. R.A.V., 112
S. Ct. at 2552 (White J., concurring). Justice White also asserted that, even if the St. Paul
ordinance was facially invalid as a content-based restriction, it survived strict scrutiny
because it was narrowly tailored to protect minorities. Id at 2556. He claimed that the
majority had created a new constitutional doctrine of "underbreadth," under which "a
narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass constitutional muster if the
object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a wider category of speech."
Id at 2554. Justice White also attacked the majority's third exception as "a catchall
exclusion to protect against unforeseen problems . . . ." Id. at 2558.

Justice White concurred in the majority's result, however, because he believed the St.
Paul ordinance was overbroad. Id. He contended that the Minnesota Supreme Court had
erred in concluding that the ordinance restricted only fighting words, because the
ordinance criminalized not only words that threaten "an immediate breach of the peace"
but also some that cause "only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment . . . ." Id. at 2560.
Justice Stevens also believed that the St. Paul statute was overbroad, but concurred
separately to express disagreement with both the majority's and Justice White's analyses.
Id at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
152. Of course, the State could have made RA. V. apposite by arguing that cross burning
constitutes fighting words, but this would have presented the State with two dangers. First,
there is no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals would have reached a different
result from the Supreme Court on this question. Second, such an argument necessarily
would have been at odds with the State's argument that the cross burning statute was a fire
protection measure. The State's very reliance on RA. V. demonstrates, again, that the State
considered the statute a content-based speech regulation even as it promoted it as a fire
protection measure. See supra note 103.
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the State's frequent reference to R.A. V and its explicit reliance on the
second and third R.A. V exceptions.1 3 Indeed, the State couched
its main argument as the Renton "secondary effects" exception to
154
!.A. V

R.A. V thus proved itself a monkey wrench in Sheldon in two
senses. First, the State's heavy reliance on R.A. V's doctrine, without
the requisite assertion that cross burning constitutes proscribable
fighting words, forced the Court of Appeals to review the inapplicable
RA.V exceptions. The State did not argue that the first exception
applied to the cross burning statute, but it did contend that the more
generalized third exception spared the statute from strict scrutiny. 155
Of course, as the court cursorily observed, the third exception did not
apply at all, for it applies only "where totally proscribable speech is at
issue. ' The State also relied heavily on the second exception, the
when in fact it could have invoked
Renton "secondary effects" doctrine,
57
V1
R.A.
from
apart
doctrine
that
More importantly, even had KA.V been genuinely apposite in
Sheldon, the R.A. V rule is itself a second-best alternative to eliminating
the Chaplinsky fighting words doctrine altogether. The Supreme
Court should abandon that doctrine for at least two reasons. First,
the fighting words doctrine allows government to penalize a speaker
unfairly based on how other people react to his speech. Under
Chaplinsky, a person's speech is unprotected only when a listener is
likely to respond violently.' 8 By contrast, there is little precedent
in the criminal law for hinging one person's criminal status on the
behavior of an unrelated actor. Instead, the criminal law usually
presumes that freewill intervenes in the deliberative processes of all
actors and that a person is ultimately responsible for his own
behavior.'59 While a listener who reacts violently to a speaker will

153. See supra note 68.

154. Here again, the State blundered. The State should have argued as its primary
position that the cross burning statute was content-neutral. See supra note 103. As a
secondary position, the State should have contended that, even if the statute was contentbased, it should be treated as content-neutral under the Renton "secondary effects"
doctrine. This doctrine, as noted earlier, see supra note 116, exists separate and apart from
R.A. V. The State did not need to invoke the latter to access the former.
155. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 61, 629 A.2d at 762; see supra note 68.
156. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 61, 629 A.2d at 762 (quoting RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547).
157. See supra notes 116, 154.
158. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
159. I have discussed this theme in more detail in arguing that the First Amendment
fighting words doctrine countermands another constitutional provision, the Ninth
Amendment. See ChaseJ. Sanders, Ninth Life: An InterpretiveTheory of the Ninth Amendmen
69 IND. L.J. 759 (1994).
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be criminally liable for assault and battery (or worse), Chaplinsky
breaks with tradition in allowing government to hold a noncomplicitous third party-the speaker-criminally liable for causing the
listener's misconduct."6
Second, the Supreme Court should remove fighting words from
the realm of unprotected speech because governmental efforts to
regulate fighting words, relative to the other unprotected classes, are
particularly susceptible to viewpoint discrimination.'61 In R.A. V., the
majority believed that St. Paul's suppression of cross burning
represented intolerable official encroachment upon a particular
message. 162 But the Court could not reprimand St. Paul under its
existing law because the message being suppressed was cast in the
form of proscribable fighting words, which theretofore had been
freely regulable by the government. The Court, therefore, expended
great energy to construct a new doctrine forbidding content-based
regulations within the unprotected classes of speech, excepting
regulations evincing no censorial purpose."3 Given the breadth of
this exception, however, as a practical matter, R.A.V stands for the
proposition that government remains largely free to regulate the
unprotected classes, only not with regulations (such as St. Paul's) that
tend to suppress a particular message and thereby evince censorship.
In other words, RA.V primarily outlaws viewpoint-based regulations
of unprotected speech." 6'
But instead of constructing an elaborate doctrine to prohibit
viewpoint discrimination among all proscribable speech, the Court
could have reached the same result in R.A.V by simply overruling
Chaplinsky. For all its doctrinal glitter, RA. V will have little precedential value outside the realm of fighting words, for obscenity,
private libel, and the other narrow classes of unprotected speech do

160. What is worse, by attaching a speaker's criminal status to the likelihood of a violent
response, Chaplinsky accommodates the reprehensible tendencies of society's most illbehaved persons. As Professor Sullivan notes, "[I]t seems absurd to give more license to
insult Mother Teresa than Sean Penn just because she is not likely to throw a punch."
Kathleen M. Sullivan, TheFirst Amendment Wars, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1992, 35, 40;
see Demise of Chaplinsky, supra note 130, at 1134.
161. See supra note 93.
162. RA. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550. Interestingly, Justice Stevens expressly did not believe
the St. Paul ordinance was viewpoint-based. He argued that the statute was "evenhanded,"
that it simply barred punches "below the belt"-i.e., on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender-by all parties. Id. at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring).
163. See supra text accompanying note 145.
164. See supra note 146.
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not readily lend themselves to viewpoint-based regulation.
Fighting words, by contrast, offer a ready medium for the expression
of viewpoints. Indeed, insofar as it will usually require an expressed
viewpoint, if only a speaker's personal opinion of his listener, to
arouse a listener's ire, viewpoint expression may lie at the very heart
of fighting words. Since the First Amendment looks most askance at
viewpoint discrimination," the Supreme Court should have used
RA.V as a vehicle to overturn the fighting words doctrine, not to
create another doctrinal cross for courts, like the Sheldon court, to
bear in safeguarding free speech.
CONCLUSION

In the guise of a fire protection measure, Maryland's cross
burning statute levied upon the expressive act of burning crosses and
other religious symbols special encumbrances, which did not apply to
other acts portending more significant fire hazards. Thus, the
statute's constitutional weakness was clear: it targeted a particular
message for official disapproval. One commentator has poignantly
captured the commonsense reasoning that exposes the statute's flaw:
[T]ruly neutral anti-burning ordinances must apply evenhandedly to speakers and nonspeakers alike. If the government allows ordinary cloth to be burned, it cannot invoke
environmental protection as a reason to ban flag burning.
The only difference between the flag and any other cloth is
the ideological symbol printed on the former, and that is, of
course, wholly unrelated to the claimed environmental
purpose.6 7 The same principles apply, of course, to wood and
crosses. 1

Because Maryland had never burdened the burning of wood, or any
other material, in the same manner as it chose to burden cross
burning, its fire-protection rationale for the statute was transparently
pretextual.

165. This is because it is difficult even to convey a viewpoint through the use of
obscenity alone, and libel is an unwieldy tool for expressing viewpoints inasmuch as it
generally requires the speaker to maliciously or recklessly utter a falsehood about another
person. Thus, it is impractical to fear viewpoint-based regulation of speech that does not
easily support the expression of viewpoints.
166. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Sheldon, 332 Md. at 53, 629 A.2d at 757 (quoting
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
167. Amar, supra note 21, at 139.
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Consequently, the Court of Appeals struck down the statute in an
eminently reasonable fashion. First, it determined that the First
6
Amendment recognized the act of cross burning as speech.' 8
Subsequently, it concluded that the State's attempt to single out this
particular speech for special regulation violated the First Amendment.

169

Between these pertinent determinations, however, the court had
to jump through an exhausting series of doctrinal hoops. First, to
determine the proper standard by which to review the statute, the
court had to classify it under a content-neutral/content-based
dichotomy into which the law did not easily fit. 7 ° Then, having
pigeonholed the statute as content-based, the court had to decide
whether certain exceptions to the RA. V rule spared the statute from
strict scrutiny review.171 Under one of these exceptions, the court
had to decide whether the statute, though content-based, should be
treated as content-neutral on account of the State's claim that the
statute innocently targeted the "secondary effects" of cross burning.
Only after the court determined that the statute was (a) contentbased, (b) not concerned with the "secondary effects" of cross
burning, and (c) not spared under another R.A.V exception, could
the court then review the statute with strict scrutiny, which spelled the
statute's demise.1 72 After all this, the R.A.V decision turned out to
be technically inapposite, given that the State never argued, and the
court never considered, cross burning to constitute proscribable
fighting words.
When a statute is challenged as unconstitutional,Justice Roberts
once remarked, "the judicial branch of the Government has only one
duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside
the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter
7
The Court of Appeals's opinion in
squares with the former."1M
Sheldon demonstrates that statutory review under the First Amendment
has grown significantly more complicated than simply reconciling the
statutory language with the text of the Amendment. This is unfortunate. The Supreme Court should clear some of the underbrush from
its First Amendment jurisprudence to facilitate the lower courts in
protecting the central constitutional ideal of free speech.

168.
169.
170.
171.

Sheldon, 332 Md. at 52, 629 A.2d at 757.
Id. at 64, 629 A.2d at 763.
Id at 53-55, 629 A.2d at 758-59.
Id. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761.

172. Id at 62, 629 A.2d at 762.
173. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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In particular, the Court should abandon its "secondary effects"
doctrine because that doctrine permits government to disguise an
improper motive to suppress speech based on the manner in which
it defends its regulation. The Court should also jettison fighting
words as a category of unprotected speech (which would propitiously
render the complicated R.A. V hierarchy largely obsolete), because the
fighting words doctrine unfairly punishes speakers for their listeners'
reactions and too readily encourages government to engage in
viewpoint discrimination. By taking these steps, the Supreme Court
could remove two hurdles that lower courts face in divining the First
Amendment's reach. The Court thereby could move toward a First
Amendment jurisprudence that properly asks society to bear the
burning crosses of a few misguided speakers, but does not ask courts
to bear their own crosses in safeguarding speech.

